How is lunar security different from space security?

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Nivedita Raju | Associate Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

This post was written by Nivedita Raju for the second edition of The Transmission. Learn more and subscribe!

My response to this question relies on a story from the ancient Sanskrit epic, the Mahabharata. There was once a kingdom ruled by a tyrant named Kamsa. Kamsa received a prophecy foretelling his death at the hands of the eighth son of his sister, Devaki. Incensed, Kamsa went on a rampage, imprisoned Devaki, and executed her first six sons. The gods were compelled to intervene to protect her last two children, including her eighth son, Krishna. Krishna was raised in secret but continuously subjected to attacks from Kamsa and his demons. Seeking an end to the violence, Krishna finally killed Kamsa.

There is a lack of clarity on permissible use and lunar activities. Amid these ambiguities, rhetoric on conflict in space and its extension to the Moon has the potential to become reality.

The potency of the self-fulfilling prophecy is evident in this morbid tale. It was the character’s conviction in the prophecy that led to his demise. The story contains a valuable lesson in the power of rhetoric for lunar security today. There is a lack of clarity on permissible use and lunar activities. Amid these ambiguities, rhetoric on conflict in space and its extension to the Moon has the potential to become reality with devastating outcomes for us all. Correcting this narrative and clarifying these rules is therefore essential. In this piece, I distinguish between lunar security and space security on the basis of its special protections under international law. I then argue that aggressive rhetoric in the absence of clearly defined rules is misguided and detrimental to all lunar stakeholders. 

Agreements regarding lunar activities suggest substantial demilitarization 

I view lunar security as a subset of space security, with a significantly greater standard of demilitarization. This is reflected in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which places an obligation to use the Moon and other celestial bodies for “exclusively peaceful purposes.” The provision also prohibits “military bases, installations, and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres.” The provision additionally specifies that military personnel for scientific research and “other peaceful purposes” are permitted. While the interpretation of the term “peaceful purposes” has undergone much debate, State practice shows that space activities have been conducted by military personnel and for various military purposes. This evidence indicates that “peaceful” is interpreted as non-aggressive, rather than non-military. 

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty places an obligation to use the Moon and other celestial bodies for “exclusively peaceful purposes.” 

The Outer Space Treaty incorporated the term “peaceful” based on several preceding UN resolutions. Its origin can be traced to the non-militarization clause in the Antarctic Treaty, which requires that Antarctica be used for “peaceful purposes only” with similar prohibitions on specific military activities. Through the course of negotiations, however, the standard was diluted for outer space, and the term “exclusively peaceful purposes” was finally agreed to apply only to the Moon and other celestial bodies. The insertion of the term “exclusively” therefore implies that for the Moon, the standard for “peaceful” is not only non-aggressive but has a higher requirement of demilitarization. Furthermore, the Moon Agreement, (though controversial due to limited signatures and ratifications) also contains clauses on lunar security, from the preamble, which mentions the need to prevent the Moon from becoming an area of international conflict, to Article 3, which prohibits the threat or use of force. The latter provision additionally prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in orbit or other trajectories to or around the Moon. While the US, China, and Russia have not adopted the agreement, other countries with lunar ambitions have ratified it.

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty places an obligation to use the Moon and other celestial bodies for “exclusively peaceful purposes.” While the interpretation of the term “peaceful purposes” has undergone much debate, State practice shows that space activities have been conducted by military personnel and for various military purposes. This evidence indicates that “peaceful” is interpreted as non-aggressive, rather than non-military.Image credit: New York Times Archives

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty places an obligation to use the Moon and other celestial bodies for “exclusively peaceful purposes.” While the interpretation of the term “peaceful purposes” has undergone much debate, State practice shows that space activities have been conducted by military personnel and for various military purposes. This evidence indicates that “peaceful” is interpreted as non-aggressive, rather than non-military.

Image credit: New York Times Archives

The behaviour of States is additionally relevant in understanding the meaning of “exclusively peaceful purposes.” From an international law perspective, the subsequent practice of States can provide aid to treaty interpretation or potentially contribute to the formation of customary international law. Even inaction (i.e., deliberately abstaining from acting) can be included in assessing whether a customary norm has emerged. This is termed “negative practice” by the International Law Commission. In the current scenario, the fact that rivalrous States have refrained from conduct that may be deemed threatening could be an indicator of the higher standard of demilitarization. Indeed, such States have instead actively cooperated on lunar missions. 

The distinct protections accorded to the Moon exhibit that while military activities are not completely prohibited, the Moon is nonetheless substantially (and almost completely) non-militarized. The broad wording of paragraph 2, would also indicate that this status extends not only to its surface but also to lunar orbits. Consequently, certain types of behaviours presently deemed lawful in outer space would not be permissible in the lunar context. 

The distinct protections accorded to the Moon exhibit that while military activities are not completely prohibited, the Moon is nonetheless substantially (and almost completely) non-militarized.

Aggressive rhetoric and mischaracterization pose a risk to lunar security

The unique topography of the Moon is such that activity will be concentrated in certain areas, an example being the Lagrange Points. Due to the potential competition which would involve new actors and technologies, a notable trend has emerged in the discussions surrounding lunar security today. Much of the narrative emphasizes geopolitical rivalries and the subsequent need for “cislunar dominance”, “leadership” and “control.” This ideology is in sharp contrast to the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty, which strives to foster a culture of cooperation and conflict prevention. In fact, it flies in the face of the aims and goals of the Outer Space Treaty, and how it was perceived by national governments. On January 27, 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson remarked, on the occasion of the signing of the Outer Space Treaty, that “[t]his treaty means that the Moon and our sister planets will serve only the purposes of peace and not of war. It means that orbiting man-made satellites will remain free of nuclear weapons. It means that astronaut and cosmonaut will meet someday on the surface of the Moon as brothers and not as warriors for competing nationalities or ideologies.”

However, today’s anxious and bellicose national military rhetoric reflects and thereby strengthens, the belief among stakeholders that conflict in space is inevitable, and might extend to the Moon. Given the difference in the legal treatment of outer space and the Moon, such rhetoric is both misguided and extremely harmful. We are presently in a period of rising tension, where rhetoric and the narratives that predominate play a crucial role. Any emphasis on “dominance” has the capacity to escalate strained relations, breed further mistrust between rivals and result in irresponsible behaviour. The space domain has already witnessed several such incidents. Avoiding the same outcomes in the lunar domain is imperative. The characterization of behaviour or activity as “threats” to lunar security requires to be substantiated on a technical basis and in accordance with international law. There is presently no consensus on what constitutes “threatening” or “irresponsible” behaviour. The latest report under UN General Assembly Resolution 75/36 acknowledges this, and there is widespread support among States to dedicate efforts to this.


We are presently in a period of rising tension, where rhetoric itself plays a crucial role. Any emphasis on “dominance” has the capacity to escalate strained relations, breed further mistrust between rivals and result in irresponsible behaviour.

Clarifying the normative framework that applies to the Moon is a useful starting point, as this will separate speculation from reality. Through the Moon Dialogs, the Peaceful Moon Action Team is undertaking this research. Our inquiry will delineate the extent of permissible military activity while balancing national interests with the continued peaceful use of the Moon. Further opportunities to enhance lunar security include bilateral cooperation through a coordination protocol between the US-led Artemis partnership and the Chinese-Russian International Lunar Research Station. Participating States could also initiate transparency and confidence-building measures specifically for lunar activities, which would be useful in communicating intent. Ultimately, enhanced lunar security is beneficial for all stakeholders. On the brink of increasing activity, it is critical that we avoid self-fulling prophecies, which would, as we’ve learned from the Mahabharata, only result in collective destruction.

Interested in learning more about lunar security? Here are some additional resources:

About the author: Nivedita Raju is an Associate Researcher at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). At SIPRI, she specializes in space security and additionally directs projects on international disarmament education. Nivedita is also a mentor for the UN Space4Women program, and Director of Legal Affairs at the non-profit Space Court Foundation. Previously, she was a Fellow at Open Lunar Foundation, and a contributing member of the McGill Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS).

Image credit: Nancy Liang (CC BY -NC-ND)

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